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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CHILDREN’S
HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL,
CONSTITUTIONAL, AND POLITICAL
CONFLICTS BLOCKING PASSAGE OF THE
CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE
CHILD
John J. Garman*
I. INTRODUCTION
The rights of children were recognized in American constitutional
law when the Supreme Court held that “neither the Fourteenth
Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone.”1 The notion of
“children’s rights” has developed into a term involving the personal
freedoms of children, parents’ authority over children, and the state’s
responsibilities regarding children.2 The Supreme Court has recognized
that children are persons with rights; however, the current movement of
the Court has been towards increasing the rights of parents over the
child.3 Currently the extent of the basic rights of children in the United
States remains unsettled.4
Children’s rights also exist as international law in the form of
conventional law and customary law. Conventional law primarily
consists of treaties entered into by sovereign states as a result of domestic
ratification that impose legal duties only on those states that become
parties to the treaties. In contrast, customary law comes from the general
practice of states and can be legally binding on all states that have not
objected to the rule as it was developed.
The primary issue to be addressed in this Article is whether or not
the United States is prepared to adhere to the international call for
children’s rights. The first Part will look at what some scholars have
called the post-Cold War era “age of globalization” where there are no

*
Associate Professor of Law, Faulkner University Jones School of Law. LL.M.,
Université de Droit, d’Economie et des Sciences d’Aix-Marseille; J.D., Vanderbilt
University; B.A., David Lipscomb College. This Article would not have been possible
without the research and editorial assistance of Christopher O’Gwynn.
1
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).
2
Roger J.R. Levesque, International Children’s Rights Grow Up: Implications for
Jurisprudence and Domestic Policy, 24 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 193, 193 (1994).
3
Id.
4
Id.
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boundaries to conflict and a complex new order based on
Institutionalism has replaced the Realist world dominated by sovereign
states for so many decades.5 In a world that, despite recent unilateral
United States action, seems to be tumbling ever closer towards resolving
its problems more through institutions rather than the old “man versus
man” approach, the United States is lagging behind the global effort of
establishing international standards for human rights and children’s
rights. The United States appears to be clinging to old Realist notions
that any international human rights law would affect its status as the
sole global superpower. The result is a lack of involvement and a global
voice for the United States for human rights and children’s rights in the
institutions that seek to further these causes. The United States’ lack of
involvement “weakens America’s voice as a principled defender of
human rights around the world and diminishes America’s moral
influence and stature.”6
The second Part will look at the human rights treaties pertaining to
the rights of the child, and in particular at the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child. The continuing reluctance of the
United States to participate will be discussed, and issues of global and
domestic politics will be analyzed as possible stumbling blocks to
ratification. Finally this Article will discuss customary and conventional
international law and the Supremacy Clause7 of the United States
Constitution. The ultimate purpose is to answer the question of whether
or not the United States is prepared to adhere to the international call for
children’s rights, starting at a global level, by discussing theories of
international relations and the treaties themselves, and at the domestic
level, by discussing the Supremacy Clause as it pertains to conventional
and customary law.
II. TWO THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS:
A REVIEW OF REALIST THEORY AND INSTITUTIONAL THEORY
A. Realist Theory
The purpose of Part II is to provide the historical development of
international relations theory, particularly focusing on the development
of Realist and Institutional theory. It is important to discuss the
Harold Hongju Koh, A United States Human Rights Policy for the 21st Century, 46 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 293, 303 (2002).
6
Kenneth Roth, The Charade of US Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties, 1
CHI. J. INT’L L. 347, 347 (2000).
7
U.S. CONST. art. VI.
5
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similarities between Realist and Institutional thought as well as provide
the major differences in order to show what motivates a country to act in
the international community. In the post-World War II era, international
relations has seen a “schizophrenic battle” between believers in
cooperation between nations and those who believe such cooperation is
“unachievable and undesirable.”8
What has developed in and dominated the field of international
relations theory had its beginnings centuries long ago, evidenced by
writings describing states aligning with and against one another,
constantly looking out for their own interests. It is the Realist notion of
international relations theory that suggests that states seek to achieve
more power and are at a constant state of war with one another for it.
Hobbes’ Leviathan is one where the Commonwealth is the provider of
law and morality for its citizens. The Commonwealth also needs a
coercive power to lead it, because “men have grief in coming together if
there is no power to overawe them.”9 As a result, a dilemma arises; even
though most are only seeking security, citizens use coercion and power
to help achieve it. Accordingly, the suspicion of other states’ intentions
will always be expected. Hobbes argues that the ultimate state of human
relations is a state of war where everyone is governed by individual
reason.10 Similarly, Realist writers base much of their writings on human
nature. “Few contemporary realists would share Hobbes’s picture of
human nature, but his analysis of the state of nature remains the defining
feature of realist thought.”11
Hans J. Morgenthau made one of the more important statements
reflecting the views of Realists towards international relations: “We
assume that statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as
power, and the evidence of history bears that assumption out.”12
Anarchy, according to Realists, does exist internationally and states must
do what is necessary to protect their citizens. In the absence of any type
of social contract among states, and in the absence of any type of
sovereign power, there are also no obligations in the relations of states.

David J. Bederman, Constructivism, Positivism, and Empiricism in International Law, 89
GEO. L.J. 469, 472 (2001).
9
KENNETH W. THOMPSON, FATHERS OF INTERNATIONAL THOUGHT: THE LEGACY OF
POLITICAL THEORY 78 (1994).
10
THOMAS HOBBES, THE LEVIATHAN 189 (C. B. Macpherson ed., Penguin Books 1981)
(1660).
11
MICHAEL J. SMITH, REALIST THOUGHT FROM WEBER TO KISSINGER 13 (1986).
12
HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND
PEACE 5 (5th ed. 1978).
8
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Rather, states are interested only in preserving themselves from harm
and they will do anything to protect themselves. Accordingly, the two
prongs of Realist theory are: (1) states act to preserve power; and (2)
power matters more than rules.13
In summary, Realists view the world as anarchic and lacking in any
type of organized authority of enforcement to resolve conflicts of
interests. The only rational actor in the Realist system is the sovereign
nation-state that acts out of its own self-interests in order to maintain its
own sovereignty. Consequently, there appears to be little room left for
any type of organization at the international level because of the
situation in which states exist.
B. Institutional Theory
The application of Institutional theory to international relations
allows the argument that international law has a direct effect on how
nations behave in the international community.14 For years the nationstate alone has been considered to be the lone actor and motivator in
global affairs. Other groups, such as international and transnational
organizations, also have an effect on the international system; the United
Nations and multinational corporations are just a few of these many
long-standing international groups. More recently, the increasing
strength of the European Union and international trade organizations,
such as General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) and North
American Free Trade Agreement {“NAFTA”), are bringing about new
types of cooperation.15 Formal organizations are commonplace, from the
local level and national governments all the way up to international

Claire R. Kelly, Realist Theory and Real Constraints, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 545, 563 (2004).
Rachel Brewster, The Domestic Origins of International Agreements, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 501,
508 (2004).
15
See BRADLY J. CONDON, NAFTA, WTO, AND GLOBAL BUSINESS STRATEGY: HOW AIDS,
TRADE, AND TERRORISM AFFECT OUR ECONOMIC FUTURE 11-13 (2002). Condon explains that
NAFTA began as a free trade agreement between Canada and the United States. Id.
Concerns over losing Canadian sovereignty lost out to the proposed increase in
competition caused by the agreement that would create more jobs and strengthen the
Canadian economy. Id. American concerns over Mexico’s lower labor and environmental
standards would lead to a “race to the bottom” were not as strong considering there was
no fear of the U.S. losing its identity or sovereignty due to its strength and position in the
agreement. Id.; see id. at 8. Condon argues that GATT was created by a desire to avoid
another world war. Id. Organizers realized that the depression of the 1930’s which
brought about an increase in fascism would not have occurred if the nations involved had
experienced prosperity and been linked in international trade. Id.
13
14
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regimes, and all of them are “tools fashioned to address some collective
problem.”16
In fact, institutions are an integral part of existence from the lowest
levels of local society to the international system. These institutions are
the machines that allow all levels to function together. Institutions in
international relations are not exclusively limited to large-scale
organizations such as the United Nations. Human rights conventions,
the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”), NAFTA, and the World Trade
Organization (“WTO”) all fall under the guise of international
institutions.17 “An effective organization requires, at a minimum,
substantial consensus on the functional boundaries of the group and on
the procedures for resolving disputes which come up within those
boundaries.”18
Autonomy and coherence are closely linked, as
autonomy helps to establish a more coherent organization. It is
important that once an organization establishes itself and becomes
autonomous, it is clear and concise in its purposes and goals. “States
often cooperate by creating international law and by complying with the
commitments they have undertaken.”19
Like all complex organizations, international regimes are purposeful
systems constructed to achieve goals that single actors cannot achieve
alone. Their chief function is to make and implement joint decisions in
order to achieve collective aims and reduce uncertainty. The survival
and effectiveness of long-term cooperation depends on successful
decision formulation and implementation. The hope of Institutional
theory is that international treaties and agreements allow nations to

Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Toward an Institutional Theory of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 1749, 1754 (2003).
17
See About the International Monetary Fund, http://www.imf.org/external/
about.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2006). Founded in 1945, the IMF “was established to
promote international monetary cooperation, exchange stability, and orderly exchange
arrangements,” as well as “to foster economic growth and high levels of employment,” and
to provide economic assistance to countries requiring help easing balance of payments
adjustment. Id.; see CONDON, supra note 15, at 9. Between 1986 and 1993, GATT members
met and during the Uruguay Round created the WTO. CONDON, supra note 15, at 9. By the
end of the Uruguay Round, 119 countries became members of the WTO with the
requirement for membership being acceptance of almost all of the agreements negotiated at
the round. Id.
18
SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES 22 (Yale Univ.
Press 1968).
19
Brett Frischmann, A Dynamic Institutional Theory of International Law, 51 BUFF. L. REV.
679, 692 (2003).
16
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maintain cooperative relationships, which will ultimately lead to greater
aggregate welfare gains for all members.20
C. Differences Between Realists and Institutionalists
Realist theory does not account for institutions in the international
system. However, Realists do not deny that states occasionally will
cooperate through international institutions. Instead, to Realists, states
are acting in what is considered to be their own best interest in order to
maintain some type of balance of power. “[T]he most powerful states in
the system create and shape institutions so that they can maintain their
share of world power or even increase it.”21 In Institutional theory,
international agreements are a means of facilitating interstate
cooperation.
In other words, treaties are driven by nations’
opportunities for mutual gain at the international level and less by what
effects the treaty would have on the domestic level.22
Institutions provide “a set of rules that stipulate the ways in which
states should cooperate and compete with each other.”23 The rules are
brought about as the result of states agreeing, through some type of
formalized agreement, to cooperate. Institutions are not an attempt to
create a world government; rather, “[s]tates themselves must choose to
obey the rules they created.”24 In fact, what motivates states to act in the
way they do is often the focal point of the argument between Realists
and Institutionalists. Perhaps the most famous passage that defends this
notion of relative gains was written by Kenneth Waltz:
When faced with the possibility of cooperating for
mutual gain, states that feel insecure must ask how the
gain will be divided. They are compelled to ask not
“Will both of us gain?” but “Who will gain more?” If an
expected gain is to be divided, say, in the ratio of two to
one, one state may use its disproportionate gain to
implement a policy intended to damage or destroy the
other. Even the prospect of large absolute gains for both

Brewster, supra note 14, at 508.
See generally John J. Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions, INT’L
SECURITY, Winter 1994-95, at 5-49.
22
Brewster, supra note 14, at 508.
23
Mearsheimer, supra note 21, at 8.
24
Id. at 9.
20
21
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parties does not elicit their cooperation so long as each
fears how the other will use its increased capabilities.25
Most significantly for this Article, human rights have played a
significant role in United States foreign policy; however, the United
States has been reluctant to allow international agreements to influence
domestic policy. This can be seen in the failure of the United States to
ratify major human rights documents and the limited use it makes of
those it has ratified.26 “[N]o authoritative American court has applied
these international rules of human rights to condemn the conduct of the
United States or any of its state and local entities . . . .”27 It appears that
the major concern is that the terms of a human rights convention would
allow other states to use the convention to influence the United States
approach to human rights. Once the United States ratifies a human
rights convention, it is obliged to follow the obligations as required by it.
This result is counter to the Realist notion of sovereign power: failure to
follow the obligations of a human rights convention would allow other
states to take issue and proceed through channels implemented in the
convention to enforce adherence to the convention’s requirements.28
III. REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS ON CHILDREN’S RIGHTS
A. A Brief Overview of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”)29
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(“ICESCR”)30 were both Cold War responses to human rights issues.
Different countries, with different political and social ideologies, gave
priority to one category over the other. In other words, the capitalist
KENNETH N. WALTZ, MAN, THE STATE AND WAR: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 105 (1959).
See DAVID P. FORSYTHE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: CONGRESS
RECONSIDERED 27 (1988) (discussing President Carter’s decision to continue business as
usual with Uganda’s President Idi Amin in spite of Congress’s unanimous decision to
restrict trade with the nation).
27
Lloyd N. Cutler, The Internationalization of Human Rights, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 575, 587
(1990).
28
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 9 (1987)
(remedies for violations of international law).
29
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171,
available at http://www.cirp.org/library/ethics/UN-covenant/ [hereinafter ICCPR].
30
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/cescr.htm [hereinafter
ICESCR].
25
26
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nations in the west favored civil and political rights, and communist
nations favored economic, social, and cultural rights.31
The ICCPR is monitored by the United Nations Human Rights
Committee, a group of eighteen individuals who meet three times a year
to consider reports submitted by member states on their compliance with
the treaty.32 Members of the Human Rights Committee are elected by
United Nations member states, but do not represent any particular
nation.33
Additionally, the ICCPR contains protocols whereby
individuals in member states can submit complaints to be reviewed by
the Human Rights Committee.34
1.

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

In 1966, the United Nations adopted two instruments protecting
human rights, the first of which was the ICCPR. The United States
signed the covenant in 1977 and the United States Senate ratified the
ICCPR on September 8, 1992.35 As of 2004, 152 total countries have
ratified the ICCPR.36
Article 24 of the ICCPR states that “Every child shall have, without
any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, national or
social origin, property or birth, the right to such measures of protection
as are required by his status as a minor, on the part of his family, society
and the State.”37 Similarly, Article 26 of the ICCPR states that “All
persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any
discrimination to the equal protection of the law.”38 These two
provisions guarantee a child freedom from arbitrary interferences with

J.A. Lindgren Alves, The United Nations: Postmodernity and Human Rights, 32 U.S.F. L.
REV. 479, 498 (1998).
32
Allison Cole, Reconceptualising Female Trafficking: The Inhuman Trade in Women, 12
CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 789, 807 (2006).
33
FRANCISCO FORREST MARTIN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN
LAW: TREATIES, CASES AND ANALYSIS 228 (2006).
34
Ambika Kumar, Using Courts To Enforce the Free Speech Provisions of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 7 CHI. J. INT’L L. 351, 354 (2006) (introducing the ICCPR
and explaining what it does).
35
UNITED NATIONS, OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, STATUS OF
RATIFICATIONS OF THE PRINCIPAL INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES (June 16, 2006),
http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/docs/RatificationStatus.pdf.
36
Id.
37
ICCPR, supra note 29, at art. 24.
38
Id. at art. 26.
31
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their liberty and to equal protection of the law.39 In contrast, the United
States Constitution does not contain any language that is comparable to
these provisions.40 Additionally, the ICCPR establishes that “family is
the natural and fundamental group unit of society.”41 In 1992, President
George H. W. Bush said of the ICCPR: “U.S. ratification would also
strengthen our ability to influence the development of appropriate
human rights principles in the international community and provide an
additional and effective tool in our efforts to improve respect for
fundamental freedoms in many problem countries around the world.”42
Although the ICCPR has been adopted and generally accepted, it has
not faired well in the courts. On June 29, 2004, Justice Souter’s opinion in
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain negated any strict adherence of the covenant in
United States courtrooms.43 Although the case was not related to
children’s rights, Justice Souter declared that the covenant does not
forcibly impose obligations on the United States as a matter of
international law.44 In a final blow to the ICCPR, Justice Souter stated,
“although the Covenant does bind the United States as a matter of
international law, the United States ratified the Covenant on the express
understanding that it was not self-executing and so did not itself create
obligations enforceable in the federal courts.”45 Justice Souter pointed
out that the Senate has refused to even allow federal courts to interpret
and apply international human rights law.46 When the Senate ratified
the ICCPR, it proclaimed that “the provisions of Articles 1 through 27 of
the Covenant are not self-executing.”47 Furthermore, the Senate declared
that “the Covenant will not create a private cause of action in U.S.
Courts.”48 Thus, the Congress and the Supreme Court are in agreement
with regard to the United States’ approach to the ICCPR.

Sanford J. Fox, Beyond the American Legal System for the Protection of Children’s Rights, 31
FAM. L.Q. 237, 240 (1997).
40
Symposium, The Energizing Effect of Enforcing a Human Rights Treaty, 42 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1341, 1372 (1993).
41
Maria Sophia Aguirre & Ann Wolfgram, United Nations Policy and the Family:
Redefining the Ties that Bind a Study of History, Forces and Trends, 16 BYU J. PUB. L. 113, 133
(2002).
42
S. EXEC. REP. NO. 102-23, at 25 (1992).
43
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2767 (2004).
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 2763.
47
138 CONG. REC. S4781-01, § I(2) (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992).
48
S. EXEC. REP. NO. 102-23, at 15 (1992).
39
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More specifically, the juvenile death penalty was the primary issue
regarding children’s rights that arose when discussing the ICCPR.
Article 6(5) specifies that the “Sentence of death shall not be imposed for
crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age . . . .”49 When
the United States Senate ratified the ICCPR, it reserved the right for the
United States to “subject to its Constitutional constraints, to impose
capital punishment on any person . . . . including such punishment for
crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age.”50 Of the 144
signatories, the United States is the only country with a reservation to
Article 6(5).51 With a growing number of countries looking at the United
States’ refusal to adhere to this clause of the ICCPR as a violation of
international law,52 scholars have argued that the United States’
reservation to Article 6(5) of the ICCPR was contrary to the object and
purpose of the treaty.53 Consequently, the United States seemed to be
faced with three choices in regards to the ICCPR: (1) withdraw its
reservations; (2) implement legislation to bring current laws into
compliance with international law; or (3) withdraw from the ICCPR all
together.54 However, in 2005, the United States Supreme Court
apparently resolved the issue with its decision in Roper v. Simmons.55
Prior to Roper v. Simmons, in 1989, in Stanford v. Kentucky,56 the
Supreme Court had determined that “We discern neither a historical nor
a modern societal consensus forbidding the imposition of capital
punishment on any person who murders at 16 or 17 years of age.
Accordingly, we conclude that such punishment does not offend the
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment.”57 At the time, the United States Senate had not considered
the ICCPR. Regardless, the opinion in Stanford gave no indication that
the Court ever considered looking towards the international community

ICCPR, supra note 29, at art 6(5).
138 CONG. REC. S4781-01, § I(2).
51
Erica Templeton, Killing Kids: The Impact of Domingues v. Nevada on the Juvenile Death
Penalty as a Violation of International Law, 41 B.C. L. REV. 1175, 1186 (2000).
52
Elizabeth A. Reimels, Comment, Playing for Keeps: The United States Interpretation of
International Prohibitions Against the Juvenile Death Penalty—The U.S. Wants To Play the
International Human Rights Game, but Only if It Makes the Rules, 15 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 303,
304 (2001).
53
Id. at 348.
54
Id.
55
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
56
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
57
Id. at 380.
49
50
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to determine whether a worldwide consensus supporting the execution
of minors existed.58
In 2003, the Supreme Court first heard arguments in the Missouri
case of Roper v. Simmons.59 In that case, the Missouri Supreme Court had
predicted that “the Supreme Court of the United States would hold that
the execution of persons for crimes committed when they were under 18
years of age violates the ‘evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society . . . .’”60 As a result, the Missouri Supreme
Court determined that applying the death penalty to a seventeen-yearold accused of robbery and murder would violate the Constitution’s ban
on cruel and unusual punishment.61
As predicted, in March 2005, the Supreme Court upheld the Missouri
Supreme Court decision, holding that executing an offender for crimes
committed before he was eighteen years old would be cruel and unusual
punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.62
The decision was 5-4; Justice O’Connor was in the dissenting group
along with Justices Scalia and Thomas and Chief Justice Rehnquist. In
the majority decision, Justice Kennedy utilized international law and the
laws of other nations in writing his majority opinion and concluded that
“the United States now stands alone in a world that has turned its face
against the juvenile death penalty.”63
Perhaps expecting a strong dissent, Justice Kennedy looked back to
several other cases where the United States Supreme Court interpreted
aspects of the Eighth Amendment using international law in its rulings
on cruel and unusual punishment.64 From Trop v. Dulles,65 he quoted the
majority opinion, stating that “The civilized nations of the world are in
virtual unanimity that statelessness is not to be imposed as punishment
for crime.”66 From Atkins v. Virginia,67 he quoted that “within the world

Reimels, supra note 52, at 306.
Roper, 543 U.S. 551.
60
State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 413 (Mo. 2003) (quoting Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)) (arguing that since the United States Supreme Court had
banned the death penalty against mentally retarded individuals in Atkins, the same
reasoning should apply to banning the juvenile death penalty).
61
Id.
62
Roper, 543 U.S. at 579.
63
Id. at 578-79.
64
Id. at 561-62.
65
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (holding that the Eighth Amendment did not permit
Congress to take away petitioner’s citizenship as a punishment for crime).
66
Roper, 543 U.S. at 575 (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 102-03) (internal quotations omitted).
58
59
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community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by
mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved.”68
Additionally, he quoted from the plurality opinion in Thompson v.
Oklahoma,69 its acknowledgment of the abolition of the juvenile death
penalty “by other nations that share our Anglo-American heritage, and
by the leading members of the Western European community,” and that
“[w]e have previously recognized the relevance of the views of the
international community in determining whether a punishment is cruel
and unusual.”70 Drawing from Enmund v. Florida,71 he quoted the
observation that “the doctrine of felony murder has been abolished in
England and India, severely restricted in Canada and a number of other
Commonwealth countries, and is unknown in continental Europe.”72
Finally, Justice Kennedy quoted the plurality decision from Coker v.
Georgia,73 stating that “It is . . . not irrelevant here that out of 60 major
nations in the world surveyed in 1965, only 3 retained the death penalty
for rape where death did not ensue.”74
Additionally, Justice Kennedy also looked to foreign sources in his
opinion. Specifically, he noted the United Kingdom’s abolition of the
juvenile death penalty in 1948, long before any international covenants
required it, and emphasized that the Constitution’s Eighth Amendment
was modeled on British law.75 Moreover, Kennedy did not fail to stress
the importance of the United States Constitution, noting that it “sets
forth, and rests upon, innovative principles original to the American
experience . . . [that are] essential to our present-day self-definition and
national identity.”76
According to Justice Kennedy, however,
acknowledgement of the rights of other nations “does not lessen our
67
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that the execution of mentally retarded
individuals was cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment).
68
Roper, 543 U.S. at 575 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317) (internal quotations omitted).
69
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830-31 (1988) (holding that the imposition of the
death penalty on individuals under sixteen is prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments).
70
Roper, 543 U.S. at 575-76 (quoting Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830-31) (internal quotations
omitted).
71
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796-97 (1982) (holding that allowing capital
punishment for felony murder violated the Eighth Amendment) (internal quotations
omitted).
72
Roper, 543 U.S. at 576 (quoting Enmund, 458 U.S. at 796-97).
73
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 (1977) (holding that imposition of the death
penalty for rape cases where death did not occur was cruel and unusual punishment under
the Eighth Amendment).
74
Roper, 543 U.S. at 576 (quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 596) (internal quotations omitted).
75
Id. at 577.
76
Id. at 578.
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fidelity to the Constitution or our pride in its origins.”77 Yet, after
affirming the importance of the Constitution, Justice Kennedy
nonetheless determined that it is “proper” to acknowledge international
law regarding the juvenile death penalty and that international law
“provide[s] respected and significant confirmation for our own
conclusions.”78
In light of previous statements she had made, praising the growth in
importance of international law, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor was
expected to cast a critical vote in the decision. For example, on October
27, 2004, she had been quoted as saying “International law is no longer a
specialty . . . . It is vital if judges are to faithfully discharge their duties,”
and that “International law is a help in our search for a more peaceful
world . . . .”79
Statements like these notwithstanding, Justice O’Connor rejected
Justice Kennedy’s reasoning and wrote her own separate dissenting
opinion, arguing that
it defies common sense to suggest that 17-year-olds as a
class are somehow equivalent to mentally retarded
persons with regard to culpability or susceptibility to
deterrence. Seventeen-year-olds may, on average, be
less mature than adults, but that lesser maturity simply
cannot be equated with the major, lifelong impairments
suffered by the mentally retarded. 80
She did agree with Justice Kennedy, however, that the Court has used
international law in the past in the decisions cited by him, but
emphasized that such decisions were not surprising, given that there are
numerous values that cross international boundaries.81
In contrast, Justice Scalia’s dissent took on a scolding tone with
venomous comments directed at the majority, beginning with the allencompassing comment that “the laws of the rest of the world—ought to
be rejected out of hand.”82 Justice Scalia, referring to the origins of the
Eighth Amendment from English law, noted that the United Kingdom
Id.
Id.
79
WorldNetDaily, O`Connor Praises International Law (Oct. 27, 2004), http://www.world
netdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=41143 (internal quotations omitted).
80
Roper, 543 U.S. at 602.
81
Id. at 604-05.
82
Id. at 624.
77
78
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also has relaxed standards on illegally seized evidence and illegally
obtained confessions, and has fewer jury trials.83 He spoke generally of
the world community, noting that most countries have stricter
limitations on abortion, no separation of church and state, and relaxed
standards on admission of evidence and when jury trials may be
demanded.84 In short, Justice Scalia portrayed the majority opinion as
self-serving: “To invoke alien law when it agrees with one’s own
thinking, and ignore it otherwise, is not reasoned decision-making, but
sophistry.”85
In summary, the Roper Court did what the Senate refused to do
when it ratified the ICCPR: banned the death penalty throughout the
United States as a punishment for offenses committed by minors.
2.

The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

The ICESCR entered into force on January 3, 1976.86 A child’s right
to protection by the government is a positive social right under the
ICESCR.87 Specifically, Article 10(3) of the ICESCR asserts that “Special
measures of protection and assistance should be taken on behalf of all
children and young persons,” and Article 12 speaks of “the right of
everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical
and mental health.”88
The first major issue of the ICESCR is the right of a child to
education. Article 13 of the ICESCR mandates that education must be
accessible to everyone in law and in fact.89 It also states that education
should contribute to the “full development” of the child’s personality,
and establishes requirements for various levels of education.90
Additionally, Article 14 requires those states that do not provide free
primary schooling “to work out and adopt a detailed plan of action for
the progressive implementation . . . of compulsory education free of
charge for all.”91 The ICESCR also requires participating states to reduce

83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
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Id. at 626.
Id. 624-27.
Id. at 626-27.
ICESCR, supra note 30.
Roper, 543 U.S. at 626-27.
ICESCR, supra note 30, at arts. 10(3), 12.
Id. at art 13.
Id.
Id. at art. 14.
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and eventually eliminate fees until education is free from both direct and
indirect costs.92
Second, the ICESCR explicitly addresses the issue of child labor.
Article 10(3) recognizes children’s right to a just and favorable working
condition and an adequate standard of living.93 The ICESCR specifically
states that nations should protect children from economic exploitation
and child labor; preserve children’s health, morals, and development;
and make the exploitation of children punishable by law.94 Arguably the
United States is already adhering to the strict standards as applied in the
ICESCR as it relates to child labor, both with domestic legislation and
international agreements like NAFTA and GATT. However, some argue
that the United States should ratify the treaty because multinational
corporations based in the United States are not adhering to similar
standards in business activities abroad.95
In 1993, Secretary of State Warren Christopher announced the intent
of President Bill Clinton to push for ratification of the ICESCR.96
However, some critics believe that the Republican wins in the House and
Senate in 1994 eliminated any chance of the ICESCR being adopted.97
Currently, the administration of President George W. Bush has yet to
take any significant steps towards reconsidering ratification of the
ICESCR.98 In fact, the treaty is effectively not an issue at this time and it
does not appear it will be considered for ratification at any point in the
near future.

92
ISCESCR, supra note 30, at art. 14, gen. cmt. 11: Plans of Action for Primary Education
art. 14 (1999), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(symbol)/E.C.12.1999.4.En?
OpenDocument.
93
ICESCR, supra note 30, at art. 10(3).
94
Id.
95
See Lena Ayoub, Nike Just Does It—and Why the United States Shouldn’t: The United
States’ Obligation To Hold MNC’s Accountable for Their Labor Rights Violations Abroad, 11
DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 395 (1999) (proposing that the United States has a duty under
international law to create legislation that would punish multinational corporations
headquartered in the United States that violate the labor rights of foreign workers).
96
Harold Hongju Koh, A United States Human Rights Policy for the 21st Century, 46 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 293, 308 (2002).
97
Id.
98
See Natasha Fain, Human Rights Within the United States: The Erosion of Confidence, 21
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 607, 614-15 (2003) (generally discussing the human rights record of the
United States under George W. Bush’s administration).
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B. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child
The passage of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”)
by the United Nations on November 20, 1989, institutionalized concepts
of international law as it pertains to children, and brought into a single
document many of the ideas previously separated into the ICCPR and
the ICESCR.99 The CRC changed international law for children by
recognizing the rights of the “whole child” and not limiting the child’s
rights to those that related to “care and protection.”100 It came about as a
proposal from Poland in 1978, leading up to 1979’s United Nationssponsored International Year of the Child.101 The CRC was opened for
signatures on January 26, 1990, and the treaty was entered into force on
September 2, 1990.102 As of 2004, 177 total countries have either signed
the CRC or have become state parties to it by ratification, accession, or
succession.103 The United States signed the convention on February 16,
1995, but the Senate has yet to ratify it.104
To protect the child’s interest, the CRC has four primary areas of
concern for children: the survival, development, protection, and
participation rights.105 The CRC specifically states that at all levels of
society and government, “the best interests of the child shall be a
primary consideration.”106 Each of these rights will be discussed
individually.
First, survival rights require participating states to recognize an
“inherent right to life” and to ensure to the “maximum extent possible
the survival and development of the child.”107 Perhaps the most
significant assurance of survival rights include access to the “highest
99
Susan O’Rourke Von Struensee, Violence, Exploitation and Children: Highlights of the
United Nations Children’s Convention and International Response to Children’s Human Rights, 18
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 589, 590 (1995).
100
Cynthia Price Cohen, Role of the United States in Drafting the Convention of the Rights of
the Child: A New World for Children, 4 LOY. POVERTY L.J. 9, 10 (1998) [hereinafter Cohen, Role
of the United States].
101
UNICEF, Convention on the Rights of the Child, http://www.unicef.org/crc/
convention.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2005).
102
Id.
103
United Nations, Office of the High Commission on Human Rights, Ratifications and
Reservations, http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/newhvstatbytreaty?OpenView&Start=
1&Count=250&Expand=11.2#11.2 (last visited Oct. 18, 2005).
104
Id.
105
Von Struensee, supra note 99, at 594.
106
Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, 44 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 49,
U.N. Doc. A/44/736, art. 3, Nov. 20, 1989, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/
menu3/b/k2crc.htm [hereinafter CRC].
107
Id. at art. 3.
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attainable standard of health and to facilities for the treatment of illness”
and that the state “ensure that no child is deprived of his or her right of
access” to these facilities.108
Development rights require states to ensure the children’s rights to
an “equal opportunity” education that is “free to all.”109 States are also
required to make higher education and vocational education “accessible
to all.”110 And while the child is getting his free education, schools must
be weary of administering punishment that is “in a manner consistent
with the child’s human dignity.”111 Development rights also include a
right of access to information. States must recognize the right of the
child to have access to mass media material “aimed at the promotion of
his or her social, spiritual and moral well-being and physical and mental
health.”112 Further, the state is required to encourage the mass media to
create more children’s material and make it easier for children to
understand the information being distributed. Under the CRC, along
with education and information, States must recognize and promote the
right of the child to “cultural, artistic, recreational and leisure activity.”113
Finally, the CRC requires that states respect the child’s “freedom of
thought, conscience and religion.”114 Interestingly, this is the only clause
discussed so far that actually brings the parents into play to “provide
direction to the child.”115
Protection rights in the CRC require the states to guard children
against every evil that society may have to offer. This includes
protecting against economic exploitation in the workplace that is
“hazardous or . . . interfer[es] with the child’s education.”116 To meet this
end, states must seek measures at all levels of government to insure a
minimum wage, proper working conditions, and proper hours.
Protective measures must also be taken by the states to protect children
from “sexual exploitation and sexual abuse.”117 Perhaps the most
significant protection rights in the CRC protect children from cruelty.
Articles 19 through 21 address instances of abuse and how the state
should deal with it. Specifically, Article 19 requires the state to address
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117

Id. at art. 24.
Id. at art. 28.
Id.
Id.
Id. at art. 17.
Id. at art. 31.
Id. at art. 14.
Id. at art. 14.
Id. at art. 32.
Id. at art. 34.
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at all levels of government “measures to protect the child from all forms
of physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent
treatment, maltreatment or exploitation, including sexual abuse, while in
the care of parent(s), legal guardian(s) or any other person who has the
care of the child.”118 In order to protect the child, states should make
“effective procedures for the establishment of social programmes to
provide necessary support for the child and for those who have the care
of the child.”119 These programs include alternative care, such as foster
care or adoption, that constitute “special protection and assistance
provided by the State.”120
Article 21 also permits adoptions and gives specific standards for
states to monitor inter-country adoption. Under the CRC, states must
ensure that with all adoptions “the best interests of the child shall be the
paramount consideration.”121 Finally, the CRC requires states to ensure
that “No child shall be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment.”122 This includes a ban on capital
punishment and life imprisonment for children under eighteen. The
remainder of Article 37 deals with the child’s rights while being
detained. Specifically, any detention must be a “measure of last resort
and for the shortest appropriate period of time.”123 If children are to be
detained, they must be able to maintain their dignity, be separated from
adults, maintain contact with their parents, and be able to seek out and
receive legal representation.124
Additionally, participation rights under the CRC provide basic
respect for a child’s opinion. States must ensure that children have the
right to develop their own views and the right to “express those views
freely in all matters affecting the child.”125 States must also ensure that
the child has the right to “freedom of expression,”126 “freedom of
thought, conscience and religion,”127 and “freedom of association and to
freedom of peaceful assembly.”128

118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
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Along with the rights discussed above, the CRC requires
participating states to initiate standards for various classes of children.
Article 20 protects orphans and entitles them to “special protection and
assistance provided by the State.”129 If for any reason a state happens to
house refugees, children, with or without their parents, those children
are entitled to “appropriate protection and humanitarian assistance in
the enjoyment of applicable rights set forth in the present Convention
and in other international human rights or humanitarian instruments to
which the said States are Parties.”130 Mentally or physically handicapped
children “should enjoy a full and decent life” and are entitled to “special
care” that is to be provided by the State “free of charge.”131 The final
class discussed in the CRC is any class considered a minority in the
participating state, who should “enjoy his or her own culture, to profess
and practise his or her own religion, or to use his or her own
language.”132
A United Nations treaty on human rights is a legal instrument but it
is “not a ‘law’ in the ordinary sense” of the term since it does not detail
specific rules and sanctions if and when those rules are not followed.133
Human rights treaties, such as the CRC, have general principles, which
must be applied by individual nations “as national law in order for the
rights to be actualized.”134 The CRC was drafted with generalized terms
and principles to meet the needs of various countries and cultures so
there is no confirmed interpretation of the text; consequently, most party
nations are forced to come to their own conclusions as to the true
meaning.135
The disappointing conclusion of the CRC is that the United States
participated so heavily in its drafting, but now can do nothing to shape
its continuing development. Because of the United States’ involvement
in writing the treaty, personal freedoms like freedom of expression,
thought, religion, and assembly from Articles 13 through 16136 have
Id. at art. 20.
Id. at art. 22.
131
Id. at art. 23.
132
Id. at art. 30.
133
Cynthia Price Cohen, The Jurisprudence of the Committee on the Rights of the Child, 5 GEO.
J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 201, 202 (1998) [hereinafter Cohen, Rights of the Child].
134
Id.
135
Id.
136
CRC, supra note 106.
Article 13
1. The child shall have the right to freedom of expression; this
right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart
129
130
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displayed to the rest of the world some of the freedoms instilled in the
Bill of Rights. Without these “individual personality” articles, it is likely
the rest of the world would not have had the benefit of their language.137
Accordingly, it would seem that, with such heavy involvement by
the United States in the construction of the treaty itself, there would be
no problem with ratification. Even the rules on implementation appear
to be fairly harmless. In United Nations human rights treaties, including
the CRC, there “are no formal ‘enforcement’ procedures, . . . [and] no
sanctions for failing to meet the treaties’ standards.”138 These treaties
assume an aspect of good faith, and once a state has ratified the treaty it
information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either
orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any
other media of the child’s choice.
2. The exercise of this right may be subject to certain restrictions,
but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are
necessary:
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; or
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order
(ordre public), or of public health or morals.
Article 14
1. States Parties shall respect the right of the child to freedom of
thought, conscience and religion.
2. States Parties shall respect the rights and duties of the parents
and, when applicable, legal guardians, to provide direction to the
child in the exercise of his or her right in a manner consistent with
the evolving capacities of the child.
3. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject
only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are
necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals, or the
fundamental rights and freedoms of others.
Article 15
1. States Parties recognize the rights of the child to freedom of
association and to freedom of peaceful assembly.
2. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of these rights
other than those imposed in conformity with the law and which
are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national
security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the
protection of public health or morals or the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others.
Article 16
1. No child shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference
with his or her privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to
unlawful attacks on his or her honour and reputation.
2. The child has the right to the protection of the law against such
interference or attacks.
Id.
137
138
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is presumed that, beyond a formal report to the Committee on the Rights
of the Child, there is no direct penalty or punishment or criticism of
domestic law that comes into play.139
During negotiations for the CRC, the American delegates had to
juggle a variety of influences when making their decisions.
Constitutional and other policy concerns were at stake causing the
delegates to respect the demands of the Department of Justice, the
Pentagon, the Department of Health and Human Services, and
ultimately the United States Supreme Court.140 But considering the time
frame in which the treaty was written, there were obvious tensions
between the East and West. There is clearly a taste of Western
democracy in the CRC.141 At that time, perhaps the United States’
interests were less on the side of children and more on the side opposite
the Soviet Union.142
Has the CRC received international legitimacy with all member
nations of the world but the United States and Somalia ratifying it? The
common perception around the international community is that it is not
enough that 191 members to the CRC have ratified it because effective
guidance of social and political actions of nations on behalf of the child
requires full participation by all states.143 The “validity of the claims to
legitimacy” for the articles of the CRC must be based “on a belief in the
legality of enacted rules.”144 In other words, the common notion is that
the CRC must become a part of the administrative, legislative, and legal
foundations of all states to achieve full legitimacy.
Such a transformation of international agreements and
standards into the laws, practices, and belief systems of
each participating nation is what is meant when the term
“implementation” is used in the Convention itself. Once
we disaggregate the meaning of “implementation of the
Convention,” the difficulties that confront such attempts
become immediately apparent. At stake are not only the
good intentions of legislators, government officials, and

See generally id., for a detailed discussion of the jurisprudence of the CRC.
Cohen, Role of the United States, supra note 100, at 40.
141
Gertrud Lenzer, The Human Rights Agenda and the Rights of Children, 21 WHITTIER L.
REV. 107, 110 (1999).
142
Cohen, Role of the United States, supra note 100, at 40.
143
Lenzer, supra note 141, at 108.
144
1 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 215
(Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., Bedminster Press 1968).
139
140
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administrators to honor the terms of these international
agreements, but also the values, belief systems, customs,
and traditional practices, which have heretofore
governed society’s attitudes and behavior towards
children and youth. When it is considered in its entirety,
the Convention both presupposes and requires
formidable changes in the political, economic, social, and
cultural realities of children. These changes will often
run against the grain of popular beliefs and practices of
elected officials, administrators, and the generality of
citizens. The task of implementing the Convention goes
far beyond the legal realms of the international
community and nations. The problem is to achieve
legitimate authority for the Convention.145
Note here, however, that the notions of Realist International theory come
into play.
A great deal has been said in recent years about the
emergence of various international and transnational
non-state actors in international politics, but it is
generally agreed that states remain the primary actors in
the international system. This is certainly the case for
human rights treaties. States—and only states—can
ratify such treaties, so they can be expected to play the
most important role in drafting them.146
In defense of United States policy towards the CRC, the Realist approach
for now may be the better option. “The United States government
maintains that the reason for the sluggish pace of ratification reflects the
degree to which it takes multilateral human rights treaties seriously.”147
Other nations are quick to ratify the treaty but do little to follow up to
ensure implementation, while the United States will only agree to adhere
to the CRC when it knows it can implement and enforce the treaty
provisions.148 This is not to say that the United States fails to see the
merits behind an institutional approach to human rights. In true Realist
Lenzer, supra note 141, at 109.
Id. at 117 n.3 (citing LAWRENCE J. LEBLANC, THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE
CHILD: UNITED NATIONS LAWMAKING ON HUMAN RIGHTS 26 (1995)) (some internal citations
and quotations omitted).
147
Alison Dundes Renteln, Who’s Afraid of the CRC: Objections to the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, 3 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 629, 631 (1997).
148
Id.
145
146
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fashion, however, international institutions only come into play when
they serve to benefit the state and provide it with some relative gain.149
Enforcement of the CRC, one would assume, would cause concern in
the United States over possible intrusion into domestic human rights
concerns. In practice, however, the CRC is essentially a toothless
agreement with no formal enforcement mechanisms on participating
states.150 Specifically, the CRC has no provisions that allow participating
states to file complaints on other states. However, the CRC does create
the Committee on the Rights of the Child that monitors the progress of
adherence to the treaty through a series of reports submitted from
states.151 The CRC also calls for other United Nations organs, such as the
United Nations Children’s Fund to submit reports that are relevant to
children’s rights issues.152 The CRC contains the assumption that all
participating states intend to be responsible for their own actions when
implementing the treaty and that any violations are dealt with under its
provisions.153 As a result the CRC emphasizes “education, facilitation,
and cooperation rather than confrontation.”154 But the CRC lacks a
procedure for children to make individual claims of violations and any
remedies for violations.155 The result is that the CRC has no direct
enforcement body that can influence domestic agendas through the
watch of any ruling committee. Therefore, the United States’ sovereignty
is not at issue.
149
150

See supra Part II.A (discussing Realist theory in regards to institutions).
See Cohen, Rights of the Child, supra note 133, at 202.
All United Nations human rights treaties have similar implementation
mechanisms. There are no courts, are no formal “enforcement”
procedures, and as previously stated, no sanctions for failing to meet
the treaties’ standards. Nations that ratify United Nations human
rights treaties are presumed to have done so in good faith. Proof of
this good faith must be exhibited in a formal report that is submitted
periodically to a committee of experts, who have been elected in
keeping with the particular treaty’s requirements.

Id.
151
152
153
154
155

CRC, supra note 106, at art. 44.
Id. at art. 45.
Levesque, supra note 2, at 218.
Id.
Id. at 219.
Since the Convention fails to establish any concrete means of
enforcement at the international level, it may be concluded that the
Convention is a fundamentally weak document which places focus on
individual Nation States enforcing the Convention themselves, rather
than using the more traditional approach of having Nation States
guard each other.

Id.
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Along with international issues and the importance of United States
involvement in the international community there are also domestic
political issues at play perhaps holding the CRC back from ratification.
In 1995, the Clinton administration announced its intentions to push to
have the CRC ratified.156 Immediately afterward, Senator Helms
submitted a resolution to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee where
he announced, “If the President does attempt to push this unwise
proposal through the Senate, I want him to know, and I want the Senate
to know, that I intend to do everything possible to make sure that he is
not successful.”157
Although the CRC never mentions abortion specifically, the
inferences made in its words have become a heated source of rightversus-left arguments regarding ratification of the treaty. As Article 6 of
the CRC recognizes an “inherent right to life” for the child, one would
think that it would be supportive of the anti-abortion movement. The
problem appears to be that Article 1 of the CRC recognizes a child as any
“human being below the age of eighteen years[,]” but does not recognize
any bottom age. So the question of whether a child becomes a viable
human being at conception is not answered. Some have interpreted the
provisions of the CRC to impose a position on abortion; however, “the
history of the drafting process indicates that the treaty was drafted in
such a way as to enable each State party to determine its own policy
regarding abortion.”158
Education and discipline provisions of the CRC are other sources of
heated domestic political debate. Article 29 of the CRC requires states to
direct the child’s education towards understanding “human rights and
fundamental freedoms” and to develop respect for “cultural identity” of
the child’s own country and “civilizations different from his or her
own.”159 This led to concern by conservative groups that this would
allow the state to prevent parents from teaching children according to
their religious beliefs.160 In regard to discipline, Article 19 of the CRC
requires States to take measures to end all “forms of physical or mental
violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment” and Article 28
requires states to “ensure that school discipline is administered in a
156
Ambassador Madeleine Albright, Remarks at the State Department Conference on
Crises (Apr. 3, 1995) (available on LexisNexis with key words “Ambassador Madeleine
Albright” and “Remarks at the State Department Conference on Crises”).
157
S. Res. 133, 104th Cong. (1995).
158
Renteln, supra note 147, at 634.
159
CRC, supra note 106, at art. 29.
160
Renteln, supra note 147, at 634.
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manner consistent with the child’s human dignity.” Many have
interpreted these clauses to mean an end to spanking at home and
corporal punishment at school.161
Abortion, education, and discipline are all major issues, but the real
issue is the rights of parents to raise their children as they see fit. Senator
Jesse Helms has been quoted as saying “the United Nations Convention
on the Rights of the Child is incompatible with the God-given right and
responsibility of parents to raise their children.”162 The natural first place
to look is at the individual rights of Article 13, freedom of expression;
Article 14, freedom of thought, conscience, and religion; Article 15,
freedom of association and peaceful assembly; Article 16, right to
privacy; and Article 17, access to information. Conservative groups feel
that “[w]hile these types of rights are acceptable for adults, they are
objectionable for children.”163 Interestingly, despite all the concerns over
parents’ rights to raise their children as they see fit Article 5 specifically
ensures that “States Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and
duties of parents.”164
Perhaps the most unfortunate aspect of the failure to ratify the CRC
is that the United States had such an involved role in the CRC, but is not
bringing the CRC’s rules back home. Because the United States has not
ratified the CRC and become a state party to the convention, it cannot
take part in developing it and seeing to its adherence in the international
community. No American delegate can be elected to the Committee on
the Rights of the Child until the United States ratifies the CRC. As a
result, any future interpretation and implementation of the articles of the
CRC will take place without the United States’ involvement. Finally, and
perhaps the most hypocritical action by the United States, is a report
published by the Department of State regarding human rights violations
around the world, including violations of the CRC.165

161
162
163
164
165

Id.; see CRC, supra note 106, at arts. 19, 28.
S. Res. 133, 104th Cong. (1995).
Renteln, supra note 147, at 634.
CRC, supra note 106, at art. 5.
Cohen, Role of the United States, supra note 100, at 40.
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IV. CONFLICTS OF LAW: THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE, CONVENTIONAL LAW,
AND CUSTOMARY LAW
A. The Supremacy Clause and International Law
In a merging of Realist thought and Institutionalism, the United
States continues to participate in international lawmaking as a means of
protecting national interests.166 The issue is to what extent the United
States will relinquish its sovereignty for the sake of international
relations. More specifically, the conflict of international law lies in the
potential undermining of United States sovereignty by subjecting the
nation to the will of others, which is in direct opposition to the
democratic notion that “people choose the rulers and the rules that
govern them.”167
The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution is clear that treaties will
become the supreme law of the land, regardless of the involvement of
other foreign nations.168 The Supremacy Clause and the constitutional
treaty power allow the President and the Senate to create federal law
without the involvement of the House of Representatives, even though
Article I states that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted” are vested in
Congress as a whole.169 The Constitution confirms the significance of
this delegated power, by both granting treaties the force of federal law
under the Supremacy Clause and expressly denying to the states any
authority to negotiate treaties on their own.170 The same section also
prohibits states, without the consent of Congress, from concluding “any
Agreement or Compact . . . with a foreign Power.”171 Finally, the
Constitution’s description of the judicial power in Article III includes the
final branch of government in treaty interpretation. Section 2 of Article
III provides that “The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law
and Equity, arising under . . . Treaties made, or which shall be made”
under U.S. authority.172 Once the President signs the treaty and the
T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Thinking Outside the Sovereignty Box: Transnational Law and the
U.S. Constitution, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1989, 1990 (2004).
167
Id. at 1991.
168
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. “[A]ll Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land.” Id.
169
Id. at art. I, § 1, cl. 1; id. at art II, § 2, cl. 2 (providing that the President shall have the
power to make treaties “by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, . . . provided
two thirds of the Senators present concur”).
170
Id. at art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (prohibiting the states from entering “into any Treaty, Alliance,
or Confederation”).
171
Id. at art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
172
Id. at art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
166

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss2/4

Garman: International Law and Children's Human Rights: International, Co

2006]

International Law and Children's Human Rights

685

Senate ratifies it, the responsibility of interpretation and application to
specific cases and controversies lies with the federal courts.
While what the framers of the Constitution intended was clear at the
time, it is questionable as to whether that intent remains.
[H]istoric patterns of expectation demonstrate that most
of the Framers intended all treaties immediately to
become binding on the whole nation, superadded to the
laws of the land; to be observed by every member of the
nation; to be applied by the courts whenever a cause or
question arose from or touched on them; and to prevail
over and preempt any inconsistent state action.173
Chief Justice Marshall wrote several of the more significant opinions
regarding the application of international law. In 1801, he broadly stated
that: “If the law be constitutional, . . . I know of no court which can
contest its obligation.”174 In 1809, he again wrote: “Whenever a right
grows out of, or is protected by, a treaty . . . it is to be protected.”175 In
several cases decided through 1829, treaty law was considered on equal
footing with federal law, especially in the face of inconsistent state law.176
Then, in 1829, the United States Supreme Court considered one of
the most significant cases regarding treaty-making power and the
Supremacy Clause. The Supreme Court established in Foster v. Nelson177
that, in addition to the Constitution or Acts of Congress, treaties of the
United States also may operate as directly applicable federal law.178
Specifically Chief Justice Marshall compared the United States’ approach
to treaties with other nations:
A treaty is, in its nature, a contract between two nations,
not a legislative act. It does not generally effect, of itself,
the object to be accomplished . . . but is carried into
execution by the sovereign power of the respective
parties to the instrument. In the United States, a
different principle is established. Our constitution
Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 760, 764 (1998).
United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. 103, 110 (1801).
175
Owings v. Norwood’s Lessee, 9 U.S. 344, 348 (1809).
176
Paust, supra note 173, at 765.
177
See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829) (holding that a treaty is “to be regarded in
courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself
without the aid of any legislative provision”).
178
See id.
173
174
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declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is,
consequently, to be regarded in courts of justice as
equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it
operates of itself without the aid of any legislative
provision.179
According to Chief Justice Marshall’s reasoning, the Supremacy Clause
“automatically turns treaty obligations into U.S. law.”180 This notion of a
self-executing treaty bypasses legislative review and allows federal
“courts to interpret treaties directly without interference from the
executive or legislative branches.”181
Foster carries great significance in international law and the
Supremacy Clause because it started the great debate over self-executing
and non-self-executing treaties.182 Marshall declared that a treaty is
“carried into execution . . . . whenever it operates of itself.”183 This
means that a self-executing treaty is operable at signing and a non-selfexecuting treaty requires further domestic action to become executed.
Marshall maintained that every treaty was “the law of the land,” but his
suggestion that some treaties did not operate automatically created a
problem. To be a self-executing treaty, the measurement as to whether
or not it was to be “carried into execution” was to be the language of the
treaty itself. It was to be carried into execution “whenever it operates of
itself,” and it was not to be self-executing if the language of the treaty
read as such. More specifically, the test that Marshall created in Foster to
determine whether a treaty was self-executing or non-self-executing was
as follows:
(1) Self-executing Treaty: “all treaties, to the extent of
their grants, guarantees or obligations . . . .”

Id.
David N. Cinotti, The New Isolationism: Non-Self Executing Declarations and Treaties as
the Supreme Law of the Land, 91 GEO. L.J. 1277, 1287 (2003).
181
John C. Yoo, Treaty Interpretation and the False Sirens of Delegation, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1305,
1314 (2002).
182
See Christopher A. Britt, The Commissioning Oath and the Ethical Obligation of Military
Officers To Prevent Subordinates from Committing Acts of Torture, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 551,
562-63 (2006).
183
Foster, 27 U.S. at 314.
179
180
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(2) Non-Self-executing Treaty: “those, which, by their
terms, required domestic implementing legislation . . . to
produce direct legal effect.”184
Generally, Chief Justice Marshall’s test has significant acceptance even in
the recent case law above and it is generally considered in line with the
intent of the Constitution’s framers.185 His test is simple in context: all
treaties, to the extent of their grants, guarantees, or obligations, are selfexecuting. Non-self-executing treaties, by their terms, require domestic
legislation or otherwise express an intention that they not be selfexecuting.
In Foster, Chief Justice Marshall classified treaty provisions as selfexecuting and non-self-executing based on the nature of the international
legal obligation embodied in the treaty.186 Marshall’s standard for
distinguishing between self-executing and non-self-executing treaty
provisions lies is the nature of the international legal obligation.187 He
assumed that different domestic legal consequences would flow from
different types of treaty obligations. An executed treaty provision
“operates of itself without the aid of any legislative provision.”188 In
contrast, “the legislature must execute” a non-self-executing treaty
provision “before it can become a rule for the court.”189 If the treaty
requires immediate performance as a matter of international law, it is
self-executing. A treaty provision is non-self-executing if a participating
state must accomplish a result in the future, some time after signing the
treaty; however, neither requires nor prohibits any particular action
immediately upon entry into force.190 In other words, a treaty that
obligates the United States to take unspecified steps toward achieving an
agreed upon objective at an unspecified future time requires action by
the political branches in order to execute the treaty.
What is most interesting about the Constitution is that it nowhere
states that treaties must come into force through legislative action
through Article I. As a result, this so-called self-executing treaty can
become a powerful document that operates as federal law even without

Paust, supra note 173, at 768.
Id. at 775.
186
Foster, 27 U.S. at 314-15.
187
David Sloss, Non-Self-Executing Treaties: Exposing a Constitutional Fallacy, 36 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1, 21-22 (2002).
188
Foster, 27 U.S. at 314.
189
Id.
190
Sloss, supra note 187, at 22.
184
185
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a vote of the House of Representatives. In the 1984 case, Trans World
Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., the Supreme Court described a selfexecuting treaty as one where “no domestic legislation is required to
give the Convention the force of law in the United States.”191 In 1888, in
Whitney v. Robertson, the Supreme Court held that treaty provisions are
self-executing when they “require no legislation to make them
operative”:192
By the Constitution a treaty is placed on the same
footing, and made of like obligation, with an act of
legislation. Both are declared by that instrument to be
the supreme law of the land, and no superior efficacy is
given to either over the other. When the two relate to
the same subject, the courts will always endeavor to
construe them so as to give effect to both, if that can be
done without violating the language of either; but if the
two are inconsistent, the one last in date will control the
other, provided always the stipulation of the treaty on
the subject is self-executing.193
Whitney and Foster go hand in hand when considering treaties—the
Constitution stops automatic conversion of a particular international
legal rule into domestic law,194 but if there is an existing rule of
constitutional law, a treaty in conflict has no domestic legal force because
the Constitution will always take precedence over a treaty.195
Constitutional questions really appear to be the primary concern
with treaty-making. Specifically, there are three considerations when
measuring a treaty against the Constitution. First, constitutionally
protected individual rights of a United States citizen will always take
precedence over a treaty.196 Second, the treaty power is subject to
federalism limitations.197 Finally, under the Supremacy Clause, a treaty
provision cannot automatically become primary domestic law because
the Constitution limits the treaty-makers’ power to create primary
domestic law by specifying that treaties are the “supreme Law of the
Land” only if they are “made, under the Authority of the United
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
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Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984).
Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).
Id.
Sloss, supra note 187, at 29, 31.
Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. 635, 657 (1853).
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1957).
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States.”198 All three of these provisions can be summed up by
concluding that if a treaty interferes with constitutionally protected
individual rights, states’ rights, or Congress’s lawmaking powers it does
not become primary law.199 Even if a treaty is considered to supersede
domestic law, the Supreme Court placed a fail-safe in the process by
declaring that “A treaty may supersede a prior act of Congress, and an
act of Congress may supersede a prior treaty.”200
B. Conventional Law
The rule governing the relationship between treaties and domestic
law is set out in the United States Constitution. Article VI, clause 2
states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law
of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Clause 2 of Article VI thus creates the notion of conventional
international law being binding upon the United States domestic law.
Section 2 of Article II sets out the following requirements for a treaty to
be binding: “He [the President] shall have Power, by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds
of the Senators present concur . . . .” As discussed above, the Supreme
Court has distinguished between self-executing and non-self-executing
treaties, such that self-executing treaties, “intended to take effect in
United States law, will in fact be interpreted and applied in United States
courts.”201
The Supreme Court has clearly taken the obligations of the United
States in the international community seriously once a convention has
been ratified. In an early case from 1804, Justice Marshall indicated that
domestic law should be construed in such a way as to avoid a violation
of the international obligations of the United States, regardless of
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
Sloss, supra note 187, at 31.
200
The Cherokee Tobacco Case, 78 U.S. 616, 621 (1870).
201
Anne Bayefsky & Joan Fitzpatrick, International Human Rights Law in American Courts:
A Comparative Perspective, 14 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 42 (1992).
198
199
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whether the treaty was self-executing or non-self-executing.202 This
proposition was followed in 1913 by an opinion by Justice Day in
MacLeod v. United States, which held that:
The statute should be construed in the light of the
purpose of the Government to act within the limitation
of the principles of international law, the observance of
which is so essential to the peace and harmony of
nations, and it should not be assumed that Congress
proposed to violate the obligations of this country to
other nations, which it was the manifest purpose of the
President to scrupulously observe and which were
founded upon the principles of international law.203
The ICCPR is one of the few human rights conventions ratified by
the United States and it is subject to declarations of non-self-execution. It
appears that this treaty will become the standard approach with future
human rights treaties.204 Consider that when ratifying the ICCPR, the
United States Senate attached the following declaration: “The United
States declares that the provisions of Articles 1 through 27 of the
Covenant are not self-executing.”205 The Senate may condition its
consent to a treaty by amending its resolution of ratification by adding
material through means of a reservation, understanding, interpretation,
declaration, or statement.206 The Senate may also amend the resolution
of ratification and insert a conditional requirement that the President,
upon ratification, amend the treaty.207
In regard to human rights treaties, conventional law that has been
ratified by the United States and is non-self-executing will likely
continue to face difficulty becoming a direct source of domestic rights.208
As all human rights treaties are “non-self-executing at the time of

Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804).
MacLeod v. United States, 229 U.S. 416, 434 (1913).
204
Bayefsky & Fitzpatrick, supra note 201, at 42 (explaining that “[t]wo of the few major
human rights treaties . . . ratified by the [U.S.] . . . were subject to declarations of non-selfexecution”).
205
S. REP. NO. 102-23, at 23 (1997). Articles 1 through 27 are the rights-granting
provisions of the ICCPR; Articles 28 through 41 establish and create responsibilities for a
Human Rights Committee. Id.
206
S. REP. NO. 106-71, at 124 (2001); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 314 (1987).
207
S. REP. NO. 106-71, at 124 (2001); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 314 (1987).
208
Bayefsky & Fitzpatrick, supra note 201, at 45.
202
203
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ratification,” they will “remain presumptively unenforceable.”209 The
two options are that Congress can pass legislation enacting a treaty or
the judiciary can extend itself into foreign affairs. Unfortunately, both
seem unlikely.
C. Customary International Law
Customary international law is one of the two sources of
international law.
Along with the conventional law of treaties,
customary law makes up the bulk of international law rules.210 Although
there are a large number of arguments regarding customary
international law, scholars have apparently agreed at least in part on the
definition as being “(1) the general practice of States, which is (2)
generally accepted as law by States.”211
In other words, while
conventional law of treaties is contractual in nature, customary law
requires state practice guided by a legal obligation to the international
community. It is the application and duration of these two elements that
eventually allows customary international law to become binding.
Customary international law has typically “covered areas of
international law such as the laws pertaining to territory, immunities, the
law of the sea, and the use of force by one State against another.”212
Additionally, customary international law “descended from the ‘law of
nations,’”213 and “[i]n its broadest usage, the law of nations comprised
the law merchant, maritime law, and the law of conflicts of laws, as well
as the law governing the relations between states.”214 In 1900, in Paquete
Habana,215 the Supreme Court held that “where there is no treaty, and no
controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be
had to the customs and usages of civilized nations . . . .”216 This notion
that customary international law is part of the federal common case law

Timothy K. Kuhner, Human Rights Treaties in U.S. Law: The Status Quo, Its Underlying
Basis, and Pathways for Change, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 419, 422 (2003).
210
Daniel H. Joyner, A Normative Model for the Integration of Customary International Law
into United States Law, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 133 (2001).
211
Michelle M. Kundmueller, The Application of Customary International Law in U.S. Courts:
Custom, Convention, or Pseudo-Legislation?, 28 J. LEGIS. 359 (2002).
212
Joyner, supra note 210, at 134.
213
Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common
Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 822 (1997).
214
Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early American Law, 42 VAND. L. REV.
819, 821-22 (1999).
215
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
216
Id.
209
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has dominated much of the scholarly debate in recent years,217 and
although its words are quite clear, this “modern approach” to customary
law is currently being brought into question.
The so-called “modern position” on customary international law has
based its rationale on general acceptance of customary international law
as being part of the federal common law.218 Additionally, the modern
position appears to also have gained wide support in the federal
courts.219 The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United
States suggests that “the modern view is that customary international
law in the United States is federal law and its determination by the
federal courts is binding on the State courts.”220
The criticisms of the modern position are that customary
international law has achieved equal ground with federal common law,
it “preempts inconsistent state law pursuant to the Supremacy Clause,”
and it can even “supersede prior inconsistent federal legislation.”221 The
traditional understanding of customary international law “governed
relations among nations, such as the treatment of diplomats and the
rules of war.”222 Interpretations of the modern position tend to
demonstrate regulations of the relationship between a nation and its
citizens, particularly prohibition against torture, genocide, and slavery,
as well as applying economic and social rights.223
It is also argued that the sources of customary international law have
changed from the norms that states practice towards “General Assembly
resolutions,
multilateral
treaties,
and
other
international
pronouncements.”224 The result is that customary law is motivated less
217
Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 213, at 816; see Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964) (concluding that the act of state doctrine must be treated
exclusively as a matter of federal law).
218
Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 213, at 816.
219
See id. at 817 n.3 (citing Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 246 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 2524 (1996)) (It is a “settled proposition that federal common law incorporates
international law.”) (internal quotations omitted); see In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos
Human Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493, 502 (9th Cir. 1992) (“It is . . . well settled that the law of
nations is part of federal common law.”); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 193 (D.
Mass. 1995) (“[I]t is well settled that the body of principles that comprise customary
international law is subsumed and incorporated by federal common law.”).
220
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111
(Reporters’ Note 3) (1987).
221
Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 213, at 817.
222
Id. at 818.
223
Id.
224
Id. at 839.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss2/4

Garman: International Law and Children's Human Rights: International, Co

2006]

International Law and Children's Human Rights

693

by a consensus of states and more by a majority, which results in a
country being forced to apply norms that are not part of either domestic
practice or of international agreements with which the country has
concurred.225 These norms then become relied upon, instead of evidence
of consistent state practices and proof that most states accept the norms
as being legally binding on them.226
Along with criticism of the modern position come suggestions for
change. The so-called “revisionist” approaches vary greatly. The first
argument is that customary international law is not a source of federal
law and is not binding on the states under the Supremacy Clause. As a
result:
(1) “[A] case arising under [customary international
law] would not by that fact alone establish federal
question jurisdiction.” 227
(2) Federal court interpretations of customary
international law would not be binding on the federal
political branches or the states. 228
(3) If a state chooses to incorporate customary
international law into state law, then the federal courts
would be bound to apply the state interpretation of
customary international law on issues not otherwise
governed by federal law. 229
(4) If a state did not, in fact, incorporate customary
international law into state law, the federal court would
not be authorized to apply customary international law
as federal or state law.230
The second argument is that customary international law should be
abandoned altogether as a source of international law because it
“undermines the integrity of the international legal system which in turn

Anthony D’Amato, Trashing Customary International Law, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 101, 103
(1987).
226
J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 449, 485
(2000).
227
Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 213, at 823-24.
228
Id.
229
Id.
230
Id.
225
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encourages disrespect for the entire system of international law.”231 A
third argument is that customary international law should only be used
“when its application can be satisfactorily justified on the basis of an
independent domestic source of authority.”232
Adopting any of these revisionist proposals would represent not
only a dramatic shift in traditional thinking about customary
international law, but also strike a blow to the international human
rights movement, particularly the children’s rights movement, which has
sought to rely on customary international law to impose norms through
the courts of the United States.
V. THE FUTURE OF THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD
The United States participated heavily in drafting the Convention on
the Rights of the Child, creating unlimited possibilities for children
around the world. The insistence of the United States delegation to
include Articles 13 through 16 regarding individual rights and child
participation has had beneficial effects around the world as children take
more active roles in education, civics, and the media.233 With such heavy
involvement in the drafting of the Convention, it is unfortunate that the
United States cannot participate in its continued implementation,
especially since the CRC has become an important part of international
human rights.234
The CRC is “one of the most significant steps taken toward
improving the lives of children throughout the world.”235 It appears that
the real work began after the treaty was written, as activists and
advocates have strived for universal ratification by the party nations and
have put pressure on those nations to adopt laws and policies to
implement the provisions of the CRC.236 Much of the attention on the
CRC has been focused on ratification and implementation by the United
States. Although there have been domestic political issues as previously
discussed, perhaps another reason for the delay in ratification is a

Kelly, supra note 226, at 540.
Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33 UCLA L. REV.
665, 672 (1986).
233
Cohen, Role of the United States, supra note 100, at 38.
234
Id.
235
Jonathan Todres, Emerging Limitations on the Rights of the Child: The U.N. Convention on
the Rights of the Child and Its Early Case Law, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 159 (1998).
236
Id.
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general lack of knowledge of the treaty by the professional community
and the general public in the United States.237
The role of children, and their continued development, is important
to the future of the United States and the world at large. The CRC strives
to accomplish a mutual respect among adults and children with
particular focus on the worth of the child as a vital part of society. This
would result in recognition of the dignity, development, and valued
opinion of the child.238 Ultimately it is the choice of individual nations to
interpret the CRC. If approached with a positive eye towards mutual
respect for the rights of the child, the United States would be viewed as
stronger, and ultimately more respected, in the eyes of the global
community. The CRC is in the best interest of the future of all mankind
because of its safeguarding of the health, survival, and progress of
children.239

237
238
239

Von Struensee, supra note 99, at 592.
Id. at 626.
Id.
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